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Naunidhi Kaur. Frontline, Volume 19 - Issue 1, Jan 2002
As the G.T. Nanavati Commission of Inquiry proceeds with its
investigation of the 1984 riots in Delhi in the wake of Indira Gandhi's
assassination, more and more tales of complicity and connivance on the
part of the police force come to light.
Startling evidence of the complicity of the police in the 1984 riots in
Delhi has been brought to light by the G.T. Nanavati Commission of
Inquiry, which is now halfway through its investigation. The Commission,
which has covered the three police districts of Delhi - New Delhi and
Central and East Delhi - was appointed by the National Democratic
Alliance (NDA) government on May 10, 2000, to look into the causes of
the violence and the manner in which it occurred. Its terms of reference
include fixing of responsibility for the dereliction of duty by the
state authorities. The depositions made before the Commission reveal
that while the majority of the police personnel tacitly supported the
rioters, a section of them actively participated in the rioting.
The police have been accused by the then general secretary of the Akali
Dal's youth wing, Kuldip Singh Bhogal, of participation in the riots. In
testimony before the Commission, Bhogal said that policemen from the
Madhuban Training Centre near Karnal in Haryana were sent to Delhi to
create chaos. He said that on November 2, 1984, a mob armed with lathis
and iron rods ran riot in the Ashram area of Delhi. He along with some
other Sikhs caught one of rioters, who was later identified as a
policeman.
Bhogal said: "A Haryana police identity card was recovered from him,
which was a clear indication and evidence that the mob to which he
belonged consisted of members of (the) Madhuban Training Centre near
Karnal and (that) they were sent to Delhi to create chaos, lawlessness
and destruction."
Other witnesses said the police not only did not make any effort to
control the mobs but actively instigated them to loot property, all the
while not allowing Sikhs to come out of their houses to protect
themselves. Ishar Kaur, a witness, said that the police did not allow
her family to take their truck to the gurdwara while mobs were targeting
the property of Sikhs. She said: "When we were bringing the truck to the
gurdwara, the police stopped us by bringing their jeep in front of us
and asked us to take the vehicle back."
Riot victims cite the case of Station House Officer (SHO) Shoor Veer
Singh Tyagi to point out the fact that some officials have easily
escaped punishment. Tyagi was the SHO of Kalyanpuri in 1984. Some of the
worst cases of arson, looting and slaughter occurred in Kalyanpuri, just
12 km from the police headquarters. On the night of November 1, 1984,
more than 200 people died there. The final death roll, mostly
constituting poor and semi-skilled male Sikhs, was 1,500.
Rahul Bedi, who was then a reporter with Indian Express, said in his
deposition that 300 yards (some 270 metres) away from Block 32 of
Trilokpuri (which is a section of Kalyanpuri) he found the path blocked
by a mob several hundreds strong. He added: "Before we could reach them,
two policemen, one a head constable and the other a constable, riding a
motorcycle, burst through the crowd coming from the direction of Block
32 and headed towards us. I flagged the motorcycle to a halt and asked
the head constable driving it whether any killings had taken place in
Block 32. The policeman said that there was shanti (peace) in Block 32.
On further probing he admitted that two people had been killed." Bedi
said that after that he was confronted by a mob that asked him to either
leave or face the consequences of staying on. He then went to the
Kalyanpuri police station and asked the duty officer and the
sub-inspector there whether there was any trouble in Kalyanpuri. Both of
them said that the situation was calm.
Rahul Bedi said: "A parked truck nearby attracted our attention and on
closer inspection we found the back of the vehicle littered with three
bodies, charred beyond recognition, and a half-charred, barely alive
Sikh youth lying atop them. In his quasi-consciousness, the man told us
that he was from Punjab and had come visiting relatives in Trilokpuri.
In the early hours of the same morning, a rampaging mob, he said, had
killed his hosts and set him alight after pouring kerosene oil on his
body. He had been brought to the police station around 11 a.m., around
four hours before we spoke to him. He had lain there ever since."
When Bedi questioned the police personnel at the station they denied any
knowledge of the incidents and said that such matters were the
responsibility of the SHO, who was away and would return only in the
evening. Looking for information, Bedi reached the police headquarters
and met Acting Police Commissioner Nikhil Kumar, who asserted that he
would not be able to do anything more than inform the police control
room as he was a "mere guest artist". After this, according to
testimony, Bedi went back to Trilokpuri where he met Shoor Veer Singh,
who then went to Block 32 with him. Describing the apathy of the police,
Bedi recounted in his deposition: "Shoor Veer Singh, walking over the
sea of hundreds of charred and mutilated bodies in Block 32, told me
'the Mussalmans are responsible for this'."
The Carnage Justice Committee (CJC) set up for the riot victims cites
Tyagi's case as an example of how easy it was for some police officials
to escape punishment. The members of the CJC quote the landmark judgment
of the Additional Sessions Judge, Delhi, Justice S.N. Dhingra. In his
judgment Justice Dhingra said: "The then SHO Shoor Veer Singh Tyagi
showed his shoorvirta by getting the innocent persons killed. His
successor Satvir Singh Rathi showed his 'love for truth' by suppressing
the truth and eliminating whatever possible evidence against the
culprits that could be eliminated. Other police officials of Kalyanpuri
faithfully followed their instructions for not taking any action." The
judgment further said that Tyagi's investigation was a farce. It
concluded that Tyagi and Rathi could not have acted in that manner
unless they had instructions from their superiors.
"Nothing came out of this historic judgment as the Commissioner of
Police did not sanction the use of Section 197 of the CrPC (Code of
Criminal Procedure) against Tyagi. This was necessary for Tyagi's
prosecution. As a result he was discharged by the court and continues to
be part of the Delhi Police," said senior advocate H.S. Phoolka, who
represents the CJC. "The response of the Delhi police in Tyagi's case
exemplifies the shoddy treatment given to the riot victims by the police
force," said advocate R.S. Chatwal, also of the CJC.
Tyagi's alleged role in abetting the killings in Trilokpuri has been
examined by various government committees, including the Kapoor Mittal
Committee which was set up to investigate acts of commission and
omission by police officers. One member of this committee, Kusum Lata
Mittal, indicted in 1988 as many as 72 officials under specific charges.
(One member of the committee dropped out midway, leaving Kusum Lata
Mittal to complete the job.) However, successive governments have shown
no interest in following up on these proceedings.
In Tyagi's case, Kusum Lata Mittal's report states that "it was clear
that the police staff of the Kalyanpuri police station had itself become
a part of the mobs indulging in killings". It took note of the fact that
while a carnage was going on in Tyagi's own district, he was ordered by
his DCP to proceed to the adjoining police district, which was not under
his jurisdiction. On the basis of this fact the committee said that it
seemed probable that senior officials of the police did not want to
intervene in the killings and hence claimed that they were unaware of
the incidents and kept themselves away.
Specific patterns of police participation in the 1984 riots can be
traced on the basis of depositions made before the Commission. Whenever
Sikhs attempted self-defence, policemen disarmed and arrested them. This
was clear from what happened at Motia Khan gurdwara in Central Delhi.
The police said that two Sikhs fired from inside the gurdwara at a mob
on November 1, 1984. The then Police Commissioner, S.C. Tandon, reached
the spot with two battalions of police and arrested both the Sikhs under
Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which held them accountable
for attempt to murder, although nobody from the mob was injured. The SHO
of the area said in his deposition before the Commission that only four
out of the 4,000 rioters had been arrested.
Most of the police officials who have been cross-examined have cited
staff shortage as the reason for not reaching the sites of violence in
time. The strength of the police force in Delhi at the time of the riots
was 22,000 constables, 3,000 head constables, 1,400 inspectors and
sub-inspectors, and some 242 higher officers, including the Police
Commissioner. While it is widely recognised that the force as a whole
was inadequate in size to service the needs of a densely populated and
growing city, it was not so thinly distributed in 1984 that it could not
have acted more positively than it did. The city was divided into five
police districts and had 63 police stations and 25 police posts. The
population of Delhi in 1984 was roughly 6.5 million, and there was one
policeman for roughly 200 people. This was a sufficient number to stop
the killings, as the police officials who appeared before the Commission
admitted that they could disperse crowds by stern warnings or by shots
fired in the air.
Deposing before the Commission, Assistant Commissioner of Police from
the New Delhi range, Ranbeer Singh, said: "While I was passing through
Bank Street I found that three or four Sikh families who were staying
there were under heavy attack. They had gone to the topmost floor of the
houses. The mob was throwing stones at them and they were also throwing
stones at the mob. The mob consisted of about 2,000-3,000 persons. I
told the mob to disperse but it did not listen. Therefore I ordered
constable Anand Singh to fire two shots in the air. The crowd thereafter
dispersed."
The participation of the Delhi Police in the riots has been discussed at
length by the Ranganath Misra Commission, which tabled its report in
Parliament in February 1987. The Misra Commission said that "when the
incidents started taking place the police remained passive, leading to
generation of the feeling that if the Sikhs were harassed no action
would be taken, and the situation deteriorated further". It also noted
that "it was not proper on the part of the police to withdraw the
licensed firearms from some people belonging to the group which was
being exposed and thus expose the weaker groups to great risk at the
hands of the rioters." It stated that there were several instances when
policemen in uniform were found marching behind or mingling with the
crowd. Since they did not make any attempt to stop the mob, an inference
has been drawn that they were part of it.
Regarding property that was looted, it said that "possession of
identified stolen property constitutes good evidence for the offence
punishable under Sections 411 and 412 IPC and provides a presumptive
link for the offence. During the riots, the police, instead of following
this known method, adopted a novel one of inviting the culprits to pile
up the stolen articles in the open, near the houses from where the
removal had been made. By this process the best evidence linking the
accused with the offence vanished".
The Misra Commission recommended that the Delhi administration
investigate the conduct of the delinquent police officers. It also
recalled that the inquiry by V.P. Marwah, launched by the Delhi
administration to identify incidents of severe failure to act and
negligence by police officials, had been derailed by high-ranking
officers in charge of South and East Delhi.
However, nothing has come out of the recommendations of the Misra
Commission. Even less came out of the recommendations of the Kapoor
Mittal Committee report, a comprehensive 400-page document, which went
into the conduct of the personnel of all the police stations in Delhi,
the Delhi Railway Police and the Delhi Armed Police in a detailed
manner. However, 17 years after the riots, the role played by the
political actors and officials of the state is still under debate. |